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Executive summary
This paper surveys the sources of market failure in urban land markets, and 
the evidence of their quantitative significance. It shows that land use planning 
generates benefits, but at significant cost. Policies of containment and 
densification limit the supply of land (and also space), not just for housing but 
for all non-agricultural land use in Britain. Our system of designated land use 
categories and development control imposes considerable costs. Where a full 
net welfare evaluation has been possible – for a tightly constrained urban 
area in South East England – it shows that the increased costs of space for 
housing substantially exceed the value of planning amenities generated, 
imposing a net welfare loss equivalent to a tax of 3.9% on incomes. 
Eliminating that welfare loss by substantially relaxing the constraint on land 
supply policy was estimated to increase the urban land take by 70%. Given 
that the total area of greenbelt land alone is 1.5 times the total urbanised 
area, even such a strong relaxation of containment policy as this would leave 
very substantial areas of greenbelt, and even if all additional urban land was 
taken from existing greenbelt areas.
This evidence is now quite old. But given what has happened to prices for 
housing land relative to agricultural land over the intervening period, and the 
evidence that the valuation of greenbelt amenities has fallen rather than risen, 
it is almost certain that the net welfare cost today would exceed the earlier 
value. There is also evidence that the planning system is imposing higher 
costs on productive uses of land. The costs of regulation imposed on office 
space in Britain substantially exceed those in Continental Europe.
There seem to be three main policy changes that would preserve the role of 
regulation in offsetting for problems of market failure while greatly relieving the 
costs of policy-imposed supply restrictions. The first would be to impose a tax 
(perhaps a modified Community Infrastructure Levy) on new development so 
that all the costs imposed on the community – more congested infrastructure, 
public services etc. – are covered. The second would be to change the fiscal 
incentives facing local planning authorities so that there is a net revenue 
benefit to local communities if they allow development, instead of the present 
situation in which a local community is in effect fined if development occurs. 
The third would be to introduce price information into land use planning 
decisions. This could be done by using information on land price 
discontinuities. Where these exceeded the environmental or amenity value of 
land in its existing designated use, there should be a presumption that 
development should be permitted.
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1 Overview: sources of market failure in urban land 
markets
Left unregulated, land markets in general, and urban land markets in 
particular, suffer from endemic problems of ‘market failure’. These problems 
arise in part because of the locational specificity of any legally defined plot of 
land, and the fact that the value that can be generated from that land and the 
welfare or enjoyment associated with its occupation are strongly influenced by 
the uses and characteristics of neighbouring plots of land. There are important 
and systematic externalities associated with land use, especially in the more 
densely developed context of cities. Understanding the sources of such 
market failures is not so hard. But devising regulations and interventions to 
offset their impact on market outcomes may sometimes be difficult.
Apart from the unpriced influence of activities on neighbouring plots, there is a 
further type of externality that is more generalised and perhaps less easy to 
grasp. In an existing city with a fixed infrastructure, the would-be purchaser of 
an additional property would add to the costs of congestion experienced by all 
existing residents and agents in the city. But this will be an external cost 
which, in the absence of intervention, would not be reflected in the costs of 
new construction or the prices of additional homes. Against this is our 
increasing understanding of the importance of agglomeration economies. 
Recent estimates (Rice et al. 2006, Graham 2007, Graham and Kim 2008) 
suggest that doubling the size of a city-region is associated with a 3.5 to 8% 
increase in total factor productivity. Such agglomeration economies, too, are a 
form of externality not taken into account by our hypothetical additional city 
resident. It could be that the gain in productivity and incomes generated for 
the existing inhabitants by the addition of one extra resident more than offsets 
the increase in congestion and space costs imposed. But in the absence of 
public policy, neither effect will influence decisions about urban growth, so we 
can have no expectation that individual cities will reach or exceed their 
‘optimum’ size1. Successful policy would ensure that urban expansion 
maximised the positive agglomeration gains from growth but minimised the 
impact on space costs and congestion.
Some of the origins of the current system of land use planning can be traced 
to a response to the ‘ribbon development’ of the 1920s and 1930s. Previous 
urban growth had exploited the expansion of suburban railways and, in 
London, the underground system. This concentrated development at the 
access nodes – stations – on the system and allowed many of the advantages 
1 It is important not to conceive of there being a single ‘optimum’ size for all cities. Each sector 
and activity is subject to varying agglomeration economies; preferences for living in cities of 
varying sizes are also likely to vary across households and with age. Cities of a great range of 
sizes should be expected to be the optimum pattern and there is a vast literature on the 
structure of city sizes (briefly surveyed in, for example, Cheshire 1999) as well as ample 
empirical confirmation of the existence of a more or less predictable urban hierarchy – 
sometimes referred to as Zipf’s law. Nevertheless, given its economic structure it may be 
useful to think of a particular city having an optimum size.
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of expansion (reflected in land value gains) to be internalised by the 
developers working together with the railway developers. Indeed, railway 
development was often financed by the uplift in land values. But as cars and 
new arterial roads replaced the railway as the dominant transport technology, 
more fragmented patterns of so-called ‘ribbon development’ became common. 
This allowed smaller developers and builders to free-ride on the publicly 
funded infrastructure, the new roads, and push cities as narrow strip 
development far out into the countryside surrounding them. This meant that 
the new arterial roads quickly became congested and failed to deliver much in 
the way of improved transport services for existing residents. In the minds of 
observers – particularly those who had recently purchased their own outlook 
on green space only to find development had engulfed them – ribbon 
development ‘ate up the countryside’.
This leads us naturally to consider a third type of market failure problem, 
which arises from the provision of optimal quantities of land-consuming public 
goods such as parks. The provision of public goods of this type may require 
the regulation of property rights, for example to conserve historic cityscapes. 
This is sometimes achieved by ‘conservation clubs’ such as the National 
Trust. In an extreme form, as embodied in the Town and Country Planning Act 
of 1947, it can involve the expropriation of landowners’ development rights to 
prevent development on greenbelts around cities.
The following sections review some of the evidence that has been built up 
over the past 20 years or so about the overall welfare effects of land use 
planning. In principle the net effects could be positive or negative. By 
correcting market failure and ensuring a supply of amenities that would 
otherwise be undersupplied, land use regulation, in the form of planning or 
zoning, creates benefits. At the same time, however, it may restrict the supply 
of valued goods, notably specific kinds of space including housing, offices, 
shops, factories or private open space such as gardens. Any planning policy 
that curbs urban expansion, increases densities or restricts building heights 
necessarily restricts the supply of particular types of space. If supply is 
restricted, the good in question becomes more expensive, and there will 
almost certainly, as a result, be effects on productivity and mobility. In addition 
there will certainly be distributional effects. Those landowners who own land 
on which it is allowed to build (or build higher) get an increase in their asset 
values, while those who are unable to develop their assets in the most 
profitable way get a corresponding reduction in asset values. Those who own 
houses gain in asset values, especially if their houses are endowed with more 
of the attributes the planning system is restricting the supply of. The ‘winners’ 
may have bigger gardens, own houses in beautiful but now preserved 
locations, or they may be owners of existing houses constructed in the 
greenbelt prior to 1947, such as former farmhouses. Those who lose out 
include people who rent or are would-be house buyers. They suffer a 
reduction in asset values or real incomes.
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2 Separation of incompatible land uses
There are two main methods of valuing amenities empirically, by ‘hedonic’ 
models, and by stated preference analysis. The use of hedonic2 models is in 
principle preferable since it is based on clear theoretical foundations and 
observes the actual behaviour of people. Any house consists of a complex 
bundle of attributes, and because each parcel of land has a unique location, 
its occupation determines access to a wide range of amenities, 
neighbourhood characteristics and local public goods. This implies that the 
value of these characteristics is reflected (or capitalised) in house prices. The 
price of any house is in a sense the aggregate price of all its attributes, 
including the access it gives to local amenities and public goods. These non-
structural attributes of houses typically account for the great majority of the 
total value of a house. A fundamental locational attribute of houses is the 
access they give to jobs and other income-earning opportunities. It is this 
attribute, in isolation from all others, that drives the classical theory of urban 
land rents and residential location as elaborated by Alonso (1960), Muth 
(1969), Mills (1972) or Evans (1973).
Although as an empirical technique, the estimation of hedonic models goes 
way back to the 1920s (see Sheppard 1999), it was Rosen (1974) who 
provided the theoretical framework and showed how the valuation of such 
goods may be estimated in hedonic models. A sizeable and ever growing 
literature has followed his contribution.
Thurston and Yezer (1994) investigated the drivers of suburbanisation, in the 
most disaggregated study to that date, and tried to unpick the old puzzle: 
does suburbanisation of jobs drive decentralisation of people? Or is it the 
suburbanisation of people that pulls jobs out of cities? They were surprised to 
find that growth in industrial employment within the central city was associated 
with more – not less – population suburbanisation in subsequent periods. 
Perhaps at the back of their minds was a conventional wisdom which 
assumed that jobs – especially blue collar, industrial jobs – were a community 
‘good’ and would attract population. In the wider urban region that might be 
the case; but not locally. Living in close proximity to industry generates 
negative externalities, which the land use planning system attempts to reduce 
by separating residential from other land uses.
When Thurston and Yezer published, hedonic studies of housing markets 
were already showing that more industry in a neighbourhood was something 
people buying houses paid a premium to avoid. House prices in 
neighbourhoods in which less land was used for industry were – all other 
things equal – more expensive. Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) reported that 
in 1984, for a sample mean house in a sample mean location within the 
Reading housing market area, a reduction of 1% in the proportion of the 
neighbourhood in industrial use was worth £74, or 0.145% of the total house 
price. In 1993, and measured in the same way, a similar reduction in industrial 
2 ‘Hedonic’ from the ancient Greek for ‘pleasure’.
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land use in the neighbourhood was worth £224 – or 0.236% of the total house 
price. The sample mean house price was £51,066 and £94,990 in 1984 and 
1993 respectively.
Later  studies  have  found  that  while  houses  nearer  to  railway  stations 
command  a  premium,  other  things  equal,  being  closer  to  a  railway  line 
reduces  a  house’s  price.  People  pay  to  avoid  the  noise  (Cheshire  and 
Sheppard 2004). A similar result for the avoidance of industrial land use was 
found recently for three Dutch cities – Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague 
– by Rouwendal and Van der Straaten (2008), again using hedonic methods.
Song and Knaap (2004) studied an area of Portland, Oregon, to evaluate the 
economic impact of design aspects associated with the ‘New Urbanism’, using 
various measures of ‘mixed use’. They found in general a negative but non-
significant effect on local house prices of more industrial land in a 
neighbourhood, and a positive and significant effect of more non-industrial 
jobs in a neighbourhood. They also confirmed the general finding that, other 
things being equal, higher density development is discounted. People seem to 
prefer to live at lower densities and are prepared to pay a premium to do so.
Recent work by Day et al. (2006), again using hedonic techniques, shows that 
ambient noise – from aircraft, roads or railways – is negatively capitalised into 
house prices. People pay a premium to live in more tranquil surroundings, all 
else being equal, and in this context ‘all else’ includes access to jobs. They 
find indications that peace and quiet is a ‘normal good’, one for which 
willingness to pay increases with income, and that a given reduction has 
higher welfare effects in a noisier context. In 1997 prices (for a model 
calibrated on house price data for Birmingham) a 1 decibel (dB) reduction 
from a level of 56dB was worth £31.49 as an annualised sum while the same 
reduction from an ambient level of 80dB was worth £88.76. Reductions in 
noise from railways seemed to be valued somewhat more highly (Day et al. 
2006, page 24). The study had difficulties accurately identifying the impact of 
aircraft noise and the demand for peace and quiet with respect to it3, although 
their study suggests a substantial demand for less disturbance from aircraft.
3 The provision of public goods and valuing 
amenities
3.1 Open space
The most obvious public good provided by the planning system is open 
space. This includes space within the city in the form of parks, recreational 
spaces or other types of preserved space, and outside it, most obviously in 
the form of greenbelt land but also farmland on which development is 
prevented by containment policies. In their survey of hedonic studies on the 
3 The authors suggest this may have resulted from the wider area affected by aircraft noise 
and their technique of spatial smoothing, although they additionally included proximity to an 
airport which had a significant negative price attached to it in some specifications.
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benefits of open space, McConnell and Walls (2005) report a wide variation 
between estimates of its value, and they highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between different types of open space. The value of preserving 
a piece of land in a certain use depends strongly on whether it is a park in an 
urbanised area, a piece of ex-urban agricultural land, or a wetland. The 
careful study of house prices in the Minneapolis–St Paul metropolitan area in 
the USA by Anderson and West (2006) shows more than this. The capitalised 
value of proximity to open space depends on the type of open space and how 
far away it is from the house, and also on the characteristics of the 
neighbourhood. For a home with the sample’s mean characteristics (including 
sample mean park size), they find that benefits from proximity to open space 
range from a low of 0.0035% of sale price for every 1% decrease in the 
distance to the nearest neighbourhood park, to a high of 0.034% for every 1% 
decrease in the distance to the nearest lake. Special parks – national, state, 
natural habitat reserves etc. – were substantially more highly valued than 
neighbourhood parks. With the mean house price estimated at $142,322, 
halving the distance to a neighbourhood park for a home with sample mean 
characteristics was associated with an increase in price of $236; while halving 
the distance to a ‘special park’ increased house values by $1,790. But an 
important finding was that the value of proximity to open space rose with 
average income and density in the neighbourhood, while it fell with distance to 
the central business district. Thus ‘open space’ might be physically identical 
but its context conditioned its value.
Given that access to open space is a ‘normal’ good, it is not surprising to find 
that it has a higher value in richer neighbourhoods, a finding that might be 
considered complementary to that of Day et al. (2006) with respect to 
tranquillity. Equally, the finding that the value of open space is higher in 
higher-density neighbourhoods suggests that, at least to an extent, public 
open space is a substitute for private open space. The reason why the value 
of open space falls with distance from the city centre could be that the total 
supply of private and public open space in suburban areas is higher, so that 
its marginal benefit is lower, or that residents of suburbs have easier access 
to open space outside city boundaries as a substitute for parks.
A potential drawback of estimating the value of proximity to open space by 
means of its hedonic price, as done by Anderson and West (2006), is that, 
while this yields the slope of the valuation of open space with respect to 
distance, its level – its total value – is not inferred. The valuation of a large 
special park might decline less with distance, simply because it is appreciated 
over a wider area. So its value to the whole metropolitan community might be 
considerably larger than the total value of a local park, whose valuation 
declines more steeply with distance. This problem is circumvented by 
estimating the value of the amount of open space surrounding a house, at the 
expense of imposing more restrictive assumptions on the relationship 
between valuation and distance. This latter approach has been applied by 
Cheshire and Sheppard (1995, 1998), who estimated a hedonic model for 
house prices in two British towns, subject to land use restrictions that varied 
significantly in severity. In order to measure the benefits of planning-induced 
amenities, these authors considered the share of land in a square kilometre 
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around each house that was used for either ‘accessible’ or ‘inaccessible’ open 
space (as well as the share of land that was not in industrial use, as 
discussed above). Although confining the valuation to the supply of open 
space within the kilometre square containing each house in the sample might 
seem restrictive, testing for alternative distances and areas suggested no 
significant effects beyond 1 kilometre.
In these studies ‘accessible’ open space meant transparently accessible to 
the public – parks, recreation grounds, churchyards or common land. This 
was mainly internal to the urban area. ‘Inaccessible’ open space was land not 
built on and not accessible to the public except in a restricted way by means 
of ‘rights of way’. This was mainly greenbelt land used for farming at the urban 
fringe, but also included private woodland. Table 1, which employs the same 
units of measurement as used above to quantify the value of less industrial 
land, summarises the results for both 1984 and 1993. It will be seen that the 
‘price’ of parks rose relative to that of greenbelt land between these years. In 
a study also for Reading, using data for 1999–2000, Cheshire and Sheppard 
(2004) found no significant price associated with more local greenbelt land.
Table 1: Hedonic price of 1% more open space in local area: sample 
mean house Reading
Source: Cheshire and Sheppard (2005)
Similar estimates were made for 1984 for the Darlington housing market. A 
difference was that Reading was well endowed with accessible open space 
such as parks, commons and recreation grounds, which totalled 18% of the 
city. In Darlington the mean value was only 8%. For edge of town open but 
inaccessible space, the position between the two cities was reversed. 
Darlington is a smaller urban area so the mean distance to the edge of town is 
much less. In Darlington the mean value was 16% compared to 8% in 
Reading. These differences in supply were reflected in estimated prices. The 
comparable values for Darlington were £83 for a 1% increase in locally 
available accessible open space, but the impact of inaccessible greenbelt-
type space was non-significant4.
4 Very few studies have moved on from estimating the hedonic prices of open space and 
other amenities to attempting to estimate price or income elasticities of demand. That by Day 
et al. (2006) provides somewhat indirect evidence on income elasticities of demand for ‘peace 
and quiet’, suggesting that the demand is income-elastic – a higher proportion of income is 
spent on peace and quiet as households get richer. So far as is known the only studies for 
Britain estimating a structure of demand for housing characteristics and so able to offer 
estimates of elasticities are those by Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) and Cheshire et al. 
(1999). They generated estimates for three different housing markets for different dates 
(Darlington 1984 and 1997, Nottingham, 1997 and Reading 1984 and 1993) and found 
1984 1993
£ As % of 
house price
£ As % of house 
price
‘Inaccessible’ open space: 
greenbelt land and farmland
102 0.200 60 0.063
‘Accessible’ open space: 
parks, common land, 
recreation grounds etc.
51 0.100 227 0.239
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Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) showed that increasing the shares of both 
types of open space yielded significant gross benefits expressed as 
equivalent variations in incomes. The benefits associated with accessible 
open space considerably exceeded those from inaccessible open space, but 
accessible open space was valued less at the margin in the town where land 
use planning was more restrictive. In a similar hedonic analysis of house 
prices in three Dutch cities, Rouwendal and Van der Straaten (2008) find a 
significant effect of the share of land in parks and public gardens within 500 
metres of a house.
Irwin (2002) focused on the value of open land external to the city in the form 
of farmland or woodland. She analysed residential transactions in an ex-urban 
region in central Maryland, USA, and found that within 400 metres of a house 
the conversion of 1 acre of developable pastureland to conservation land 
raised the average house price by 1.9%, while converting it to public land 
yielded a premium of 0.6%. That is, the more certainly the agricultural land 
was protected from development, the greater its ‘value’. Even conversion to 
low-density residential land had a negative impact on surrounding house 
prices, underlining the fact that one of the important attractions of open space 
is simply that it is not developed. This negative impact is also likely to be one 
reason for NIMBYism. As Fischel (2001) has argued, since houses form a 
substantial element in people’s asset portfolios and they are immobile, there 
is a significant incentive to protect their value by using local zoning or 
planning policies to prevent land in one’s neighbourhood from being 
developed.
Although the hedonic approach has the advantage that it rests on revealed 
preferences – actual behaviour – it also has potential limitations. It is only truly 
applicable if the value of the amenity in question is localised within the 
housing market area covered by the study. This may be reasonable in the 
case of a neighbourhood park or a local school, but would be questionable in 
the case of an amenity for which demand extended over a wide area, such as 
National Parks or heritage coastline, or world famous attractions, such as 
Hyde Park in London, or a famous cityscape such as Venice.
There is an alternative approach to valuing such amenities and that is stated 
preferences, sometimes known as ‘contingent valuation’. In this approach, 
people are asked to put a value – how much they would be willing to pay and 
in what circumstances – to have access to particular amenities or just to know 
that they exist so they could access them if they felt inclined. This approach 
has the disadvantage that people may make different choices or suggest 
different values when they are actually confronted with decisions for which 
they have to pay. There is also potential for the ‘free rider’ problem in which 
people overstate their valuations in order to increase the supply of an amenity 
that will largely be paid for by others. Although research using the contingent 
valuation method has become substantially more sophisticated over time, 
substantial stability of estimates for different markets and over time. Estimates of the income 
elasticity of demand for open space amenities were in the range 1.0 (accessible land in 
Reading in 1984) to 2.0 (closed land in Darlington in 1997).
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these methodological concerns remain (cf. Arrow et al. 1993, McConnell and 
Walls 2005). Nevertheless, it may yield valuable insights that complement 
findings relying on revealed preferences, and sometimes there is simply no 
alternative method available.
As in their survey of hedonic studies, the McConnell and Walls (2005) survey 
of stated preference research finds substantial heterogeneity in the estimated 
stated value of open space, and again its type and location appear to matter a 
lot. Nevertheless, for agricultural land, the stated value is in the same order of 
magnitude as in the Irwin (2002) study of ex-urban house prices discussed 
above, suggesting that fears about missing wider benefits of agricultural land 
using hedonic methods may be misplaced. Also consistently with Irwin’s 
results, stated preference studies suggest that negative externalities of 
residential development are an important motivation for the preservation of 
open space.
On the basis of a survey of stated preference research in the UK, Barker 
(2003) also reported that the value of open space depends strongly on its 
location and use (see Table 2, copied from Barker 2003, page 36). For 
instance, publicly accessible open space in the urban core was estimated to 
be valued much more than greenbelt land, and the landscape value of 
intensively farmed land is particularly low. However, the values in Table 2 are 
derived from various sources using a variety of methodologies and are not 
comparable to those discussed above.
Table 2: Benefits from different land use in the UK
Source: Barker (2003)
These values are, nevertheless, broadly consistent with those in Cheshire and 
Sheppard (1995). Open space at the urban fringe, not accessible to the 
public, has a relatively low but still significant value. Extensively farmed land – 
with higher amenity value and more likely to have public access – is estimated 
to be worth considerably more than ‘fringe greenbelt’, much of which has no 
significant public access and is intensively farmed. The values reported in 
Barker are significantly higher than in most US studies that are surveyed by 
McConnell and Walls. Perhaps this is a parallel finding to that of Anderson 
and West (2006): open space is more valuable in more densely developed 
contexts and densities are greater in the UK than in the USA. In the UK there 
are also some access rights even to agricultural land by means of public 
footpaths or other ‘rights of way’. So the amenity value of agricultural land in 
Land type Present benefit
(per hectare per year, in 2001 
₤)
Urban core public space (city park) 54,000
Urban fringe greenbelt 889
Urban fringe forested land 2,700
Rural forested land 6,626
Agricultural extensive 3,150
Agricultural intensive 103
Natural and semi-natural wetlands 6,616
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the UK – even in Europe generally – may be higher than in the USA or other 
countries which have no rights of public access to private land.
3.2 Urban design and densification
While this discussion of the benefits of land use regulation has so far focused 
on the separation of incompatible land uses and the provision of open space, 
planning is about much more. It is regarded as providing benefits to citizens 
that markets would not offer. Benefits which have received attention in so-
called ‘’ initiatives in the USA, and their variants in Europe, are dense 
development (‘densification’), mixing land uses, particularly to provide jobs 
near to homes, access by public transit and the provision of infrastructure for 
pedestrians and bicycles. The valuation of such planning-induced features of 
neighbourhoods may be estimated using hedonic techniques. This is 
obviously appropriate because any benefits of urban design in new 
developments seem likely to be fully capitalised. An interesting example is 
Song and Knaap (2003, 2004), whose work was discussed above in the 
context of valuing the separation of incompatible land uses. They find some 
significant effects for several new urbanism design features in a hedonic 
model of the Portland, USA, housing market, but not all were valued 
positively.
They did find that better connectivity of local street networks, pedestrian 
accessibility to commercial uses and proximity to light rail stations raised 
house values. On the other hand they found that higher densities of 
neighbourhoods and mixed land uses within a neighbourhood have a negative 
impact on house prices. This is the complementary finding to that which 
shows ‘space’, both within houses and external to them in gardens, is a highly 
valued attribute of houses. There is also evidence that there is a strong 
income elasticity of demand for private space (Cheshire and Sheppard 1998). 
This finding of a preference for lower density development, other things being 
equal, is also consistent with the detailed findings of Burchfield et al. (2006) 
that one of the drivers of lower density development is the existence of 
drillable aquifers. The need for a mains water supply generates a diseconomy 
of lower densities because of the costs of a mains supply and the associated 
pipelines. Where there are drillable aquifers this centripetal force is lost, the 
costs of lower density development fall and densities are observed to become 
lower. When a given urban area contained a zone in which there was a 
drillable aquifer then, all else being equal, development within the zone over 
the aquifer was at lower densities.
4 Optimising urban growth and size
It was noted in the introduction that agglomeration economies are the raison 
d’être of cities and that there is increasingly convincing evidence not just of 
their existence but of their importance. Figures 1a and 1b illustrate this, and 
show how city size in an unregulated world might tend to be too big. Again it 
should be stressed that since the significance of agglomeration economies 
varies strongly by sector (see for example Graham 2007 or Overman 2009), 
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and preferences for different sized cities are likely to vary between 
households, there is no single ‘optimum’ size for cities. But for any given city, 
given its economic activities and the preferences of households living within it, 
there is likely to be a particular optimum size.
In Figure 1, adapted from Combes et al. (2005), city size is measured as N, 
the number of workers within it. In both the upper and lower halves of the 
figure wages (w) and costs (H – housing costs) rise moving away from the 
origin. Both wages – because of agglomeration economies – and housing 
costs rise with city size. The reason for housing costs rising with size is 
consistent with basic urban economic theory and competition for space and 
accessibility to jobs.
Figure 1a: Wages and costs of living with city size
12
Figure 1b: ‘Optimal’ city size
In Figure 1b we can see the net real wage rising and then falling with city size, 
as labour productivity rises but rising ‘gross’ wages are eventually offset by 
rising costs. The labour supply curve – in the sense of the number of workers 
wanting to live in or move to the city – also rises with city size. The point, 
however, is that the city is attractive to individual workers to the point where 
the labour supply curve crosses the net wage curve at a size of N* – which 
will be the equilibrium size for the city. But the ‘social’ optimum from the point 
of view of existing residents would be at NB, where the net wage is 
maximised. The discrepancy between optimal and equilibrium size arises 
because new migrants to the city are motivated by whether their net wage 
exceeds the supply price of their labour, but their arrival triggers a cost to all 
existing residents by driving up house prices. Although the increase in costs is 
represented here only in the form of rising space costs, there will in fact be 
increases in congestion and perhaps infrastructure costs too.
The above analysis suggests a case for planning to limit the size of cities 
below that to which they would grow in an unregulated world. But this market 
failure does not mean that current planning policy, with its goal of urban 
containment designed to limit the physical spread of cities, increase mean 
densities and limit their growth, has got it right. The evidence suggests almost 
conclusively that it has got it wrong from a welfare and economic point of 
view, and that policy is unduly constraining both the physical spread and the 
size of British cities.
There are at least two issues. The first is how policy might transfer the cost of 
their decision to live in the city to marginal urban inhabitants. The second is 
the welfare and price effects of current policies of urban containment and 
restrictions on space availability. Let us consider the first of these issues.
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5 Internalising costs of urban growth – paying for 
infrastructure
Part of the market failure associated with city growth is the increase in space 
costs imposed by additional workers on all existing inhabitants, and on the 
commercial users of space. Another element is the cost imposed in the form 
of additional strains on infrastructure and more congestion – not just of 
transport systems but also of other urban public services such as education.
The obvious solution to at least the second of these is to charge additional 
urban residents the full costs they impose on the transport system and other 
infrastructure. Within the framework of land use regulation, this can be done 
by charging developers for the full costs they impose. Such fees would 
become capitalised in land prices so the ultimate incidence would be on the 
landowners whose land is developed.
Two quite distinct and separate logics support charging developers for the 
granting of planning permission. The first is the long-established legal 
principle of Betterment. The existing system of Section 106 Agreements is 
based on the logic of Betterment. The second is a much more recent idea of 
community impact. The logic for Impact Fees rests on this. Where Impact 
Fees are imposed in the USA, they have legally to satisfy a ‘rational nexus’ 
test: that is, for them to be legally valid government has to be able to show a 
clear connection between the development and the need for additional 
infrastructure and other resources, and the level of fees has to be a function 
of these costs.
Betterment goes back to a case of 1427 and rests on the idea that, if the 
community has created a part or all of the increase in land values, it should 
benefit from that increase. The idea of an Impact Fee rests on the argument 
that if development imposes costs on the community in the form of additional 
infrastructure, perhaps schools, amenities or utility capacity, these costs 
should be thought of as a part of the costs of the development and be paid for 
by the developer in the form of an Impact Fee. In practice, where such fees 
are charged, it appears, as theory would predict, that they are 100% 
capitalised into the price paid by developers for land (Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessy 2004).
Impact Fees have several advantages over planning gain charges. Unlike 
Betterment levies they do not require establishing land values before and after 
the granting of planning permission. They seem to have a firmer basis in 
natural justice and are entirely transparent. By contrast, Section 106 
Agreements are far from transparent and have high transaction costs 
associated with them. Each Agreement has to be negotiated separately, and 
large developers acquire considerable expertise in their negotiation. Indeed, it 
is likely that Section 106 Agreements produce a significant barrier to entry. 
These high transaction costs are reflected in the fact that less than 50% of all 
local planning authorities have ever negotiated a Section 106 Agreement.
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Charges based on Betterment, where they require the estimation of how 
much the community has increased land values by their action, have a long 
history of failure. Historically, attempts to impose such charges seem to have 
led to a short to medium-run reduction in land supply because of expectations 
of repeal. Impact Fees create an incentive – or at least remove an important 
disincentive – to local communities to allow development.
The level of Impact Fees should be set in relation to national formulae 
calculated to reflect estimates of actual community development costs in 
different locations, and the revenue from Impact Fees should be hypothecated 
to the purposes which gave rise to them, so infrastructure is constructed 
where it is most needed.
The level of Impact Fees would vary from place to place according mainly to 
the extent to which existing infrastructure was congested, and would be 
calculated on the basis of formulae designed to reflect the costs of new 
development. Estimating the increase in land price uniquely associated with 
granting planning permission is fraught with difficulty and has to be done on a 
case by case basis. Here the term infrastructure is shorthand for all costs 
imposed on the community. These might include open space provision, 
schools and other educational establishments, medical facilities, utilities such 
as water supply, libraries and transport capital spending among others.
With respect to natural justice, one of the problems of ‘Betterment’ is that most 
of the uplift in value associated with granting planning permission at present 
comes not from the expenditure of effort and resources by the community, but 
from the constraint on supply imposed by existing planning regimes. If 
development imposes extra costs on the community it is hard to argue that 
these should not be paid for by the developer and ultimately by the landowner. 
Moreover, there is the danger that any tax (including Section 106 Agreements) 
based on value uplift could create a perverse incentive for planning authorities 
to keep land even scarcer to increase net revenues from permissions. With 
Impact Fees, revenues only accrue if development goes ahead, and their 
value depends not on land values (which can be kept high by keeping land in 
short supply) but on the costs of the necessary complementary infrastructure. 
It has been shown in the USA that, where they are applied, Impact Fees 
reduce planning restrictiveness (Burge and Ihlanfeldt 2006).
Impact Fees would reduce the incentive for local communities to be NIMBYist 
and would help finance and focus new infrastructure investment where there 
was most congestion. If Impact Fees were calculated on the basis of formulae 
designed to reflect local and regional infrastructure congestion, and the 
revenues were used to relieve that congestion, a major source of the negative 
incentive for planning authorities to grant planning permissions, particularly for 
commercial development, would be removed. At the moment, a negative 
incentive arises because local governments and planning authorities have to 
spend money to service any development but get no revenues from them (see 
Cheshire and Hilber 2008). Impact Fees would also eliminate a negative 
‘political economy’ incentive to local voters – they would not suffer increased 
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infrastructure congestion as a result of development but instead would get 
better, more modern, facilities.
The Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) is a form of Impact Fee, although its 
basis of calculation should be revisited so that the charge reflects all aspects 
of ‘congestion’ imposed by new development. If a more active CIL or Impact 
Fee were introduced, it would seem essential not to reform Section 106 
Agreements but to eliminate them. One further advantage of Impact Fees is 
that they would apply to all development on a common and transparent scale. 
Section 106s are highly variable and opaque and, because of transaction 
costs, apply only to larger developments. One paradox is that our planning 
system is generating smaller and smaller developments because of 
densification and smaller site sizes, so presumably a falling proportion of 
developments are actually incurring Section 106 Agreements.
6 Sustainability and carbon emissions
It is often claimed that land use planning is a weapon with which to combat 
market failure leading to global warming. The idea of ‘sustainability’ is related 
to this, as is the policy of ‘densification’.
While patterns of urban development may influence energy use in the very 
long run, it is important to note that:
• Because new construction is such a small proportion of the stock of 
buildings, the regulation of new construction can only significantly 
influence energy use in the very long run. To get results over a period 
corresponding to that needed effectively to meet emission targets requires 
action to reduce energy use in existing buildings;
• Policies of containment, town centre first and greenbelts, may in fact 
increase energy use because they separate residents (who are 
decentralising) from retail outlets, and as commuters move out beyond the 
greenbelt commuting journeys are likely to lengthen;
• The relationship between density and energy use is at best weak. The 
early reported findings of Newman and Kenworthy (1989) have been 
largely discredited. Simply adding the price of energy to the model almost 
eliminates the statistical significance of urban density;
• Most importantly, if there is a market failure because the market for energy 
does not reflect the external cost of global warming, the solution is not to 
tackle the failure by regulating land markets but by regulating or taxing 
energy markets appropriately.
While as a complementary policy land use regulations may attempt to 
encourage more energy-efficient buildings and patterns of development, the 
underlying market failure is not in the land market so excess energy 
consumption provides no grounds for significant planning policies. Moreover, 
since newly constructed buildings tend to be more energy efficient than older 
ones, it is important to frame any regulation in ways which increase the rate of 
building rather than restraining it, since this will lead to the more rapid 
replacement of older, less energy efficient buildings. Indeed, if regulations 
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governing energy use in buildings are too ambitious and so impose undue 
costs on developers, this could in principle slow the rate of improvement in 
energy use of the total stock of buildings by reducing the rate of new building.
7 Correcting market failure contrasted with 
restricting supply
It is possible to have a powerful system of land use regulation or planning 
without restricting the overall supply of space or buildings. For example, there 
could be strong coordination of development with infrastructure and a 
direction of new development to planned areas without restricting supply.
In reality, almost any system of land use planning is likely to have some 
restricting effect on supply. The question in practice is to what extent supply is 
restricted and whether this restriction causes significant price distortions or 
welfare effects. For many years the Dutch system of land use planning (see 
Needham 1992) appeared to provide strong direction for development and to 
prevent urbanisation in large areas (the Groene Hart, or  Green Heart, 
separating the four cities of the Randstad, which acted very much as a large 
urban park with much public access) without restricting the overall supply of 
land for urban development. This appeared to reflect the historical 
development of planning in the Netherlands out of the legal requirements on 
local authorities to drain land and supply sufficient land for community 
purposes. This gave not only a cultural tradition of providing land for 
development but a significant fiscal incentive to local communities, which 
profited from selling prepared land on to commercial developers. In recent 
years, however, political pressure for urban containment has increased in the 
Netherlands.
There may be reasons associated with market failure, as discussed in Section 
4 above, for regulation to limit the extent of urban growth if the negative 
externalities of additional residents more than offset the gain in agglomeration 
economies that such residents might generate. As we shall see below, 
however, the evidence from the UK suggests strongly that policy in Britain 
restricts urban growth to an extent which leads to substantial welfare losses, 
higher costs for economic agents and serious price distortions in land 
markets: in other words a situation of policy failure rather than one of market 
failure.
In offsetting for any of the land market failures identified above, planning will 
restrict supply to some extent. The provision of open space benefits can only 
be achieved by preventing building on protected land5. By definition, when 
5 This does not mean that an unregulated market  will  never provide optimal quantities of 
public goods such as open space or separating incompatible uses. Where a tract of land 
owned by one developer is large enough, such benefits can be ‘internalised’ and captured by 
the developer. This is the exact complement of using hedonic analysis to measure the price 
paid for such benefits or their value in welfare terms. Their value is capitalised into the price 
paid for houses. It is often claimed that the development pattern of West London, with larger 
landowners  participating  in  residential  development,  led  to  its  typical  pattern  of  ‘garden 
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open space is provided external to the built-up area via ‘containment’ policies 
designed to protect ‘greenbelts’, urban land supply is restricted. Equally, 
height controls or other controls restricting the area of buildings relative to site 
size (frequently a binding constraint for office development), or conservation 
measures requiring the preservation of the external appearance of buildings, 
are effectively restrictions on the supply of land or space in buildings.
Even with such policies, the question which has to be asked is what exactly 
the regulatory system restricts the supply of. Different systems and 
instruments of land use planning may restrict the supply of different attributes 
of the built environment. For example, the planning system in the UK explicitly 
restricts the supply of land for urban development by imposing containment 
boundaries and greenbelts. There are also stringent restrictions on the height 
of buildings and on preservation6. But British planning policies do not impose 
much restriction on the subdivision of existing developed sites where they are 
not subject to conservation policies. In the USA, by contrast, there are strong 
restrictions on converting existing houses to multiple occupation or to 
subdividing already built lots. Portland, Oregon, is famous for its ‘growth 
boundary’ – an instrument of containment analogous to the urban envelope 
boundary in Britain. But the system in Portland still restricts the numbers of 
lots available for development rather than the area of land directly. Many 
communities in the USA also impose minimum lot sizes which to European 
eyes can be oppressively large7.
8 Evidence on the effects of land use regulation
8.1 Land and house prices
Notwithstanding the heterogeneous form in which supply restrictions come, 
their universal effect is to push up land and building prices. Indeed, various 
countries and cities have experienced soaring house prices in recent years, 
and, in some cases, the role of planning as a mechanism restricting supply 
has been well established. Glaeser et al. (2005) in their study of the 
Manhattan housing market, where prices increased by more than a half 
between 1980 and 2000, concluded that supply restrictions imposed by the 
New York zoning laws, particularly on height, were the likely cause.
squares’. Similarly ‘gated communities’, especially in newer developments in the USA, are 
developed specifically  to  internalise benefits of  security,  open space and the exclusion of 
incompatible land uses.
6 An interesting curiosity  of  conservation policies in the West End of London is the price 
premium commanded for larger single-floor flats. Listed building regulations prevent knocking 
through dividing walls between many houses in Mayfair and Belgravia, thus restricting the 
supply  of  larger  single-floor  apartments  in  the  area.  These  now  command  a  significant  
premium per square metre.
7 Some communities in the Midwest have 10 acre minimum lot sizes. Glaeser and Gyourko 
(2003) conclude that  in many communities  in New England the willingness to pay for  an 
increase in lot size beyond the mean is negative, so that people are being constrained to buy 
and consume more land than they would ideally like. But they still found that house prices  
were increased as a result of this restriction on supply. What was being restricted was the 
supply of house-plus-land bundles.
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In several European countries recent rises in aggregate house prices have 
also been related to land use regulation. This has been a particular issue in 
Britain, where there has not only been a long-run upward trend in real house 
prices (increasing in real terms by a factor of 3.5 between 1955 and 2002 – 
see Cheshire and Sheppard 2004), but also increasing volatility in the housing 
market. The argument here is that if the supply becomes less responsive to 
price changes because of regulatory restrictions, any short-run changes in 
demand translate more directly into price changes. In a series of reports to the 
Treasury and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Barker (2003, 2004) 
identified both the falling affordability of housing and a reduced 
responsiveness of supply to demand. She argued that the British planning 
system was the main cause of these problems. Furthermore, the Barker 
reports contain a thorough discussion of the consequences of such housing 
and land market institutions for the wider economy and for aggregate welfare. 
Real house prices have also risen substantially over the past decades in the 
Netherlands (increasing by a factor of three in real terms since the early 
1970s), which may be attributed at least in part to a lack of supply 
responsiveness. Vermeulen and Rouwendal (2007) find that Dutch housing 
supply had become almost totally price-inelastic as a consequence of 
government interventions in land and housing markets.
Long-term trends in real house prices in the UK and the Netherlands contrast 
starkly with, for instance, the German experience, where the real price of 
houses fell in both the decades of the 1980s and 1990s and was completely 
stable over the whole period 1971 to 2002. Over the same 30-year period, 
German real household disposable incomes increased at 2.6% a year 
compared to 2.3% in the Netherlands and 2.9% in the UK (OECD 2004), so 
variation in this typical determinant of housing demand across these countries 
has been modest compared to the observed variation in real house price 
growth. However, similar shifts in demand may lead to strongly divergent price 
developments under different supply conditions, and in line with this argument 
the estimated price elasticity of housing supply in Germany of 6 is of a 
completely different order of magnitude from that in the other two countries 
(Swank et al. 2002).
Some of this evidence pointing to the role of planning in restricting supply 
elasticities is circumstantial in nature. But recent studies that deal with one or 
more of these issues do suggest that land use regulation restricts housing 
supply while pushing up prices. In an analysis of new residential construction 
in US cities, Mayer and Somerville (2000) distinguish separately the average 
delay in obtaining permission for subdivisions, the number of growth 
management techniques and the imposition of impact fees. They report that 
metropolitan areas with more extensive regulation can have up to 45% fewer 
starts, and price elasticities that are more than 20% lower than those in less 
regulated markets, even if the effect of Impact Fees is not statistically 
significant. Ihlanfeldt (2007) analysed the impact of an aggregate measure of 
land use regulations on jurisdictional variation in house prices in Florida, USA. 
Dealing carefully with the issue of endogeneity, he also found a significant 
positive impact of tighter regulation on prices. Moreover, in another study with 
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Burge (Burge and Ihlanfeldt 2006) he had already shown that communities 
which used Impact Fees and therefore had a greater fiscal incentive to permit 
development were indeed less restrictive.
US researchers have only become sensitised to the role of land use 
regulation in increasing real house prices and market volatility quite recently. 
Few if any studies there pre-date 2000. Many European countries have 
tended to have stronger and more restrictive land use policies for much 
longer. The basic framework and aims of current British policy were 
established by the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, so urban land 
take and space have been restricted for two generations.
The most obvious ways in which these restraints manifest themselves are in 
price distortions in land markets. In South East England or the west of the 
Netherlands, for instance, ‘grotesque’ (Muellbauer 2005) discontinuities exist 
between the price of land in agricultural use and adjacent land that is zoned 
for residential development. Cheshire and Sheppard (2005) report an 
increase of price from £7,500 to £3,000,000 per hectare at the urban 
boundary in Reading.
Figure 2a: Prices of developable cleared land in South East England
Data for 2007 – see Figures 2a and 2b – shows several locations where the 
value of agricultural land if it were rezoned to permit residential development 
is well over £6,000,000 per hectare. This means that permission to change 
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use from agricultural to residential increases the price of land some 700-fold. 
The highest-priced locations are in South East England, as would be 
expected since pressures for urban growth are strongest there, but there are 
a number of areas in the South West, West Midlands, North West and North 
with housing land prices estimated to exceed £3,000,000 per hectare. Some 
of these, such as parts of Cumbria and Northumberland, are in National 
Parks, but most are not. Against the background of such direct evidence on 
the planning-induced segmentation of land markets, the question of whether 
land use regulation raises prices seems somewhat pedantic.
Figure 2b: Price of land developable for housing: England
8.2 Net welfare costs
Nevertheless, in spite of a sizeable literature on the impact of land use 
regulation on supply and prices, evidence on its net impact on welfare and the 
distribution of any such impact over different groups in society is scarce. The 
first such study and so far the only one for Britain is that by Cheshire and 
Sheppard (2002). This set out a methodology to estimate the net welfare 
effects of land use regulation and implemented it in Reading, a tightly 
restricted but reasonably representative community in South East England. 
The study used hedonic price estimates reported in Cheshire and Sheppard 
(1995), coupled with data on the incomes, travel costs and demographic 
composition of the households, to estimate the structure of demand for both 
private residential land and planning-produced amenities such as open space, 
as a function of prices and household income. This demand system is 
integrated in a monocentric urban economic model calibrated to various data 
sources for the Reading housing market.
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Since the costs and benefits of changing the planning system both operate 
through the residential land market, the authors can use this model to 
estimate the trade-offs involved in producing a little more or less of the 
‘planning amenities’ and a little more or less of private space for residential 
occupation. From this it is possible to estimate the net welfare effects of 
relaxing the planning system’s constraints on land supply in various ways. 
Since the underlying model assumes equilibrium in urban land markets – an 
assumption which seems reasonable given the results of hedonic research 
over the past 20 years or so – it simulates long-run static equilibrium 
outcomes. The area of open space amenities and housing densities adjust 
fully to changing prices8. The results are summarised in Table 3.
Table 3: Welfare costs and impact on urban land take of land use 
planning policies restricting the supply of land
Net costs of open space and containment policies: Reading 1984
Modest 
relaxation
Significant 
relaxation
Average net cost of land use planning (£ per 
annum)
210.94 407.44
Standard deviation of net costs of land use 
planning
376.68 335.40
Net cost as percentage of income 2.01 3.89
Capitalised land value at urban periphery 30,000 25,000
Percentage increase in urban land area 46.0 70.7
Source: Cheshire and Sheppard (2002)
The results show that both increasing the amount of residential land made 
available within the city boundary and shifting the containment boundary 
outwards have positive net social gains, although the gains from the latter 
policy option are substantially larger. Thus there is clear evidence that current 
policies were restricting the supply of land in the Reading housing market to 
an extent which had a substantial negative impact on welfare. It could be said 
that a significant relaxation of the supply restriction – even though it would 
reduce the value of the amenities generated by planning – would produce a 
welfare gain equivalent to 3.9% of income or, put another way, the extent of 
the restriction was roughly equivalent to a 3.9% tax on incomes.
Since the demand for land was estimated within the model, it was also 
possible to estimate the impact on total land take which such a relaxation of 
policy would imply. As the price of land fell and consumption increased, the 
total size of the Reading urban area would expand by 70%. These findings do 
not support the abolition of land use regulation altogether, since the system 
did produce benefits. The problem is that this restrictive system produced 
those benefits at considerably greater cost to the community than the value of 
8 This  is  not  literally  possible,  but  hedonic  studies  suggest  highly  sophisticated  search 
behaviour in housing markets with expected values of some attributes such as the degree of 
protection of open land or school  quality  commanding a price rather  than current  values. 
Moreover, densities adjust quickly via for example infill,  conversion or multi-occupation, at 
least in a British context in which land use planning permits such changes.
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the benefits themselves. It forced residents to substitute open land, mainly 
greenbelt land (since containment was by far the most severe constraint on 
urban land supply) to most of which there was only limited access for private 
open space in the form of gardens. People’s observed consumption behaviour 
implied they valued more garden space (and cheaper housing) more than 
they valued the loss of planning-produced open space.
In the same study, Cheshire and Sheppard consider the distributional effects 
of land use regulation. This was possible because their sample included the 
precise location of the houses (and so the ‘value’ of their consumption of 
planning-produced amenities) and the income of the households. With respect 
to the gross benefits, they report that the provision of inaccessible open space 
– greenbelt land – tended to increase inequality. The benefits were even more 
inequitably distributed than were the incomes of owner-occupiers. The 
separation of industrial from residential land was broadly neutral in 
distributional terms compared to the incomes of owner-occupiers, while the 
provision of accessible open space tended to reduce inequality. But adding all 
three amenities together, the net welfare effect was almost distributionally 
neutral, again relative to the distribution of the incomes of owner-occupiers. 
This suggests that richer households benefit more from planning-induced 
amenities, but that they also pay a higher price for them through the housing 
market.
A more recent study for the Netherlands by Rouwendal and Van der Straaten 
(2008) closely follows the work by Cheshire and Sheppard, although their 
prime focus was on open space within cities. In a stylised theoretical model, 
the authors show that the amount of open space in a neighbourhood is 
optimal when the total benefits of increasing it by one unit are equal to the 
local price of residential land. Applying this cost-benefit rule to three Dutch 
cities, they find that the share of land in open space is too high in Amsterdam, 
too low in The Hague and approximately optimal in Rotterdam. The similarity 
in the specification of land use externalities suggests that the same first-best 
policy rule would apply equally in the Cheshire and Sheppard model. Since 
the local provision of open space renders urban growth boundaries 
superfluous in such an ideal setting, it is not surprising that relaxing growth 
restrictions in Reading was found to be so beneficial in welfare terms.
In a later paper Cheshire and Sheppard (2003) used the structure of demand 
and the valuation of open and private space as estimated in their 2002 model 
(rather than assuming values as was done by Bento et al. (2006), in their 
simulation for ‘ideal’ US cities) and then modelled the welfare effects of three 
alternative containment policies: growth boundaries, fuel taxes and a tax on 
the consumption of land.
Each tax rate was selected to achieve the same total urban take of land as 
the observed urban growth boundaries in the first case. The result was that by 
a significant margin, the most welfare-effective mechanism was a tax on land 
consumption. A fuel tax was no more efficient in welfare terms than an urban 
growth boundary. This assumed, however, that tax revenues were converted 
entirely into welfare – there was no deadweight loss associated with collection 
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and spending. It also did not evaluate the welfare impact of the growth 
boundary itself. It simply asked the question: if this is the total urban area that 
society wants, what is the least costly way in welfare terms of achieving it? 
They also took no account of other possible benefits associated with fuel 
taxes.
9 Cost on economic users of commercial space
All the above evidence has related to the impacts of land use planning on 
prices and welfare through the residential sector. By far the largest proportion 
of a city’s occupied land is in residential use. But planning restrictions can 
also have impacts on prices and welfare in other land uses. There is very little 
evidence, but again in principle there are likely to be benefits and costs, and 
to observe price increases is not necessarily to infer a welfare loss. If the 
supply of, say, commercial space is restricted, then there will be both 
distributional effects and output and efficiency impacts. Owners of property 
who are allowed to (fully) develop will gain, while owners of property unable to 
develop will lose. The costs of commercial space will be increased and since 
such space is an input into production, output prices will increase and total 
output and employment will fall. It is the difference between the value of any 
amenities generated and the loss of output which reflects the net welfare cost. 
But without information on the nature of trade-offs in the production function 
between space and other inputs it is not possible to estimate the change in 
output which higher space costs produce9.
As has already been noted, European governments seem less wary of 
regulating markets than is the case in the USA. Moreover, since revenues 
from property taxes accrue to the local community in the USA, the US fiscal 
system provides a very strong incentive for local communities to encourage 
commercial development, and to use minimum zoning regulations to price out 
poorer households which are perceived as demanding more locally financed 
services than they contribute in property taxes. Business property taxes are a 
particularly important source of net revenues to local governments. In the 
USA, business property creates more tax revenues than it costs local 
communities to service. Again these conditions are not often found in Europe, 
where in some countries, notably the UK, business property taxes are a 
national tax providing no direct revenues to local communities at all despite 
the legal obligation which local communities have to provide services for 
businesses. Thus, in effect, the fiscal incentive is reversed and local 
communities in Britain are ‘fined’ for allowing any development at all.
9 The revealed behaviour  of  firms suggests  space  is  not  perfectly  substitutable  for  other 
factors and that, therefore, there is some output or efficiency loss. We can infer this because 
in locations where space is cheaper, the same firm uses more space per employee – industry  
estimates are that space per employee is about twice the level in New York as it is in similar  
firms in London. A comparison between space use in British supermarkets compared to the 
US also reveals that where retail space is cheaper the optimal use of it is greater per unit of 
sales. Since space still costs something – even in the cheapest locations – firms would not  
use more of it if that did not produce a productivity gain.
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Table 4: Reading urban land prices: 1984
Land use £000’s per acre 
Current
£000’s per acre
2002 prices
Office use
Zone 1 7,964–13,2411 15,748–26,183
Zone 2 3,806–8,3701 7,526–16,551
Zone 3 2,621–5,1031
Zone 4 602–1,3081 1,190–2,586
Retail
Zone 1a 28,779–34,1512 56,908–67,531
Zone 1b 24,467–27,8182 48,382–55,008
Zone 2 12,807–15,7942 25,325–31,231
Zone 3 9,786–12,4582 19,351–24,635
Zone 4 8,941 17,680
Zone 5 3,020–3,9272 5,972–7,765
Zone 6 5,688
Zone 7 2,539 5,021
Industrial
Zone 1 400* 791
Zone 2 500* 989
Zone 3 450* 890
Residential
Edge of existing urban area 120–205 237–405
Source: Cheshire and Sheppard: Estimated by Healey and Baker (2005)
*Estimated variance ±  5%
1 Range of observations.
2 Range of estimates varying with exact location and floor plan size/access/permitted 
structure type.
We should not be surprised to discover, therefore, that there are significant 
restrictions on the supply of land for offices and other commercial uses such 
as retail. The impact of these is revealed by the land price data shown in 
Table 4, which shows a discontinuity of land prices at the margin of each use. 
In 1984 prices, land zoned for residential use was around £200,000 per acre, 
whereas the cheapest land zoned for industrial use was £400,000 per acre, 
the cheapest land zoned for office use was a minimum of £600,000 per acre 
and the cheapest retail land more than £2.5 million. Land values collected 
less systematically for the same market in 2005 (see Cheshire and Sheppard 
2005) confirmed the very large premium for land zoned for housing compared 
to agricultural land (£3 to £4 million per acre compared to around £5,000) but 
also that there was by then a significant premium for residential land 
compared to industrial land.
This is strong circumstantial evidence that for a long time the planning system 
– at least in more prosperous parts of Britain – has been constraining the 
supply of land: not just for residential purposes but for a range of commercial 
uses. A recent study by Cheshire and Hilber (2008) produces far more 
systematic evidence. They estimated the ‘Regulatory Tax’ (RT) for 14 British 
office locations over as long a period as data were available – in the case of 
the City of London and the West End, from 1961. They also were able to 
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generate comparable estimates for eight Continental European locations and 
Manhattan for shorter periods.
The key idea of the RT approach is simple. In a world with competition among 
property developers and free market entry and exit, the price of developed 
space will equal its minimum average cost since this includes ‘normal’ profit. It 
seems reasonable to argue that competition between developers and free 
entry are reasonable assumptions, both because of the low costs of entry to 
small-scale development (such as converting a single building to office use) 
and the international nature of the development industry. In Britain the best 
known example of international entry might be Olympia & York, the Canadian 
developers of Canary Wharf, but most provincial office locations have 
examples of buildings developed by Japanese, German, Dutch or Swedish 
developers.
Marginal construction costs rise with building height, so in the absence of 
restrictions on heights, buildings should rise to a point where the marginal 
cost of adding an additional floor equals its market price. If building higher is 
less profitable per square metre than building over a greater area, we still 
should expect the marginal cost of an extra floor to be equal to price. 
Buildings would be lower and the urban land take would be greater. Bertaud 
and Brueckner (2005) demonstrate the formal equivalence of height 
restrictions compared to land supply restrictions. Any gap between the 
observed market price and the marginal construction cost can be interpreted, 
therefore, as a ‘regulatory tax.’ This is the additional cost of space resulting – 
in aggregate – from the system of regulation in that particular market. If the 
sales price of an additional floor of office space exceeded the marginal cost of 
building this additional floor, then developers would have an arbitrage 
opportunity. The difference between the price of floor space and its cost of 
construction must be due to some form of regulation.
The RT is an aggregate measure of the gross cost of regulatory constraints 
limiting the height and floor area of buildings and – more indirectly – the 
supply of land for the use in question. So it reflects the costs of restrictions on 
land supply, space by plot ratios or height restrictions, or common forms of 
conservation designation. It does not, however, capture costs imposed by 
compliance complexity or delays in decision-making. In addition, it only gives 
a ‘cost,’ not a net welfare or net impact on output measure. As discussed 
above, there are measurable benefits from some aspects of regulation and, 
since space is substitutable to a degree in both production and consumption, 
the effects on output or welfare can only be estimated if both the benefits and 
the extent of substitutability are known. So the RT estimates are a lower 
bound estimate of a gross cost of land use regulation in any location.
Mean values of the RT as estimated by Cheshire and Hilber (2008) are shown 
in Table 5. They are shown as a percentage of capital values or costs. The 
mean value for London’s West End between 1999 and 2005 – shown as 809 
– therefore represents a tax rate of 809%. It is immediately apparent that 
values for the British office locations are substantially higher than those for 
Continental European locations and that the only available estimate for 
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Manhattan is effectively zero. That is consistent with the observation made 
above about how the US fiscal system generates a substantial incentive to 
allow commercial development.
It is not surprising to find a higher cost in London’s West End or the City of 
Paris than in the City of London, London’s Docklands or La Défense. Amenity 
values are higher and conservation regulations are stronger in such locations. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear why much lower levels of restriction are justified 
by local amenities in Amsterdam or Brussels (Belgium is well known for 
having very flexible planning controls by European standards) than in London 
Docklands or even Birmingham. The gross costs for most British office 
locations strongly suggest that the degree of restriction on office space goes 
far beyond the value of any amenities generated. It is not clear what amenities 
could possibly justify office space in Birmingham costing nearly 50% more 
than in Manhattan.
Table 5: Estimated Regulatory Tax for UK and selected European office 
markets. The RT is expressed as a percentage of marginal construction 
costs
City Estimated Regulatory Rax rate (RT)
UK Markets† 1999 2005
Average 
1999–2005
London West End 918 889 809
City of London 641 334 488
Canary Wharf 343 277 327
London Hammersmith 277 182 219
Manchester 271 250 230
Newcastle upon Tyne 106 119 97
Croydon 118 99 94
Edinburgh 311 262 291
Glasgow 233 205 204
Maidenhead 372 227 270
Reading 271 161 203
Bristol 153 196 157
Birmingham 259 268 250
Leeds 215 217 193
Selected European Cities: alternative 
data sources – see Cheshire and 
Hilber (2008) for details 1999 2005
Average 
1999–2005
London West End 762 837 800
City of London 468 431 449
Frankfurt 544 331 437
Stockholm 428 330 379
Milan 207 411 309
Paris: City 235 375 305
Barcelona 223 316 269
Amsterdam 212 192 202
Paris: La Défense 141 193 167
Brussels 52 84 68
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United States (based on Glaeser et 
al. 2005)
1996 
(cycle bottom)
2000 
(cycle peak)
Manhattan (New York City) 0 50
Source: For details of how these values were calculated see Cheshire and 
Hilber (2008). Here they are expressed as percentages.
A large number of observations over many years also allowed the Cheshire 
and Hilber (2008) study to investigate the causes of more and less restrictive 
planning regimes across British locations. This provided strong evidence that, 
where planning policies were controlled by or on behalf of business interests, 
the planning regime was significantly less restrictive; that the degree of 
restrictiveness responded to local prosperity, so that higher unemployment 
meant a less restrictive regime; and that the transparent elimination of any 
incentive for local communities to allow commercial development, generated 
by the transformation of the Business Rates into the Uniform Business Rate – 
a national tax – significantly increased the degree of restrictiveness. Indeed, 
the paradoxical finding was that a change which was intended to stop local 
councils penalising entrepreneurship by imposing too high a property tax in 
fact increased the costs of office space by more than any feasible business 
rate increase could have done.
10 Instruments to offset for market failure and reduce 
economic costs
This means that there is clear evidence of market failure characterising urban 
land markets. But there is equally clear evidence that in Britain land use 
planning designed to offset these problems has led to a very significant 
restriction in the supply of land not just for housing but for all urban uses. 
Land use planning generates valued benefits, but it does so at a significant 
net cost, borne by economic agents and in the form of net welfare costs to 
citizens.
Two potential solutions to problems of land market failure, and to reducing the 
costs of supply restriction, have already been identified. One – discussed in 
Section 5 – was to impose an Impact Fee or Levy on all new development, set 
to offset for the full costs which additional development imposes on the 
community. Another related change would be to alter our system of local 
taxation so that local communities derived some benefit from permitting 
development. At present, because Business Rates are a purely national tax 
and Council Tax covers such a small proportion of local authority obligations, 
there is in effect a fine on local communities for permitting development. 
Additional housing or business property imposes greater financial obligations 
on the local resident – and voter – than it generates in tax revenues.
There is, however, a third and more radical change that should be made. At 
present planning allocates a scarce resource – land – but does so without any 
reference to the price effects that such decisions impose10. As was shown 
10 It could be argued that PPS3, by requiring the planning system to take account of its 
decisions in terms of the impact on housing affordability, did introduce some price information. 
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above, this causes very serious distortions in land markets. Huge price 
discontinuities are observed at the boundary separating one designated use 
from another. Moving a metre or so in many parts of South East England, 
from within the urban boundary to identical land beyond it, could see land 
prices drop from perhaps £6,000,000 per hectare to £10,000. Obtaining 
permission to convert industrial land to retail use might increase land values 
tenfold.
These price discontinuities contain important information about relative 
scarcity. They also respond very flexibly to local conditions. They should and 
could be used to inform planning decisions. Obviously there may be good 
reasons for preserving a park or a beautiful area of high amenity countryside 
from being developed, especially if there is public access to it. Equally, many 
historic townscapes and habitats have high environmental or amenity value 
and should be conserved. However, as the evidence of both Table 1 and Table 
2 demonstrates, much greenbelt land, and most intensively farmed land, has 
very little environmental or amenity value. The market does not fail, and the 
market price of this land more or less represents the value its existing use 
contributes to the economy and to society. There may be an argument for 
restricting urban growth if congestion and the other costs of urban growth 
exceed agglomeration economies, but that concern can be handled as 
discussed below.
This suggests that where the premium for land in some other use such as 
housing compared to its existing use, say agriculture or industry, is sufficient, 
then that should generate a presumption in favour of development unless it 
can be shown that the amenity or environmental value generated by the land 
staying in its existing use exceeds the observed premium. If there is a general 
judgement that, on balance, the costs associated with urban growth exceed 
the agglomeration economies, then there could be added to this rule the 
requirement that the premium exceed some minimal threshold. In effect this 
would impose a specific tax on the transfer of land from agricultural to urban 
use and, as was discussed in Section 8, urban containment produced by 
taxing land use seems to have lower welfare costs than achieving the same 
urban land take by means of regulation alone.
This proposal to introduce price signals into land use planning decision-
making is outlined in more detail in Cheshire and Sheppard (2005). Although it 
seems radical, it would be relatively easy to implement. Of course, 
determining the exact value of environmental or amenity benefits associated 
with any parcel of land in its current use presents an almost impossible task. It 
cannot be done precisely and beyond argument. However, this would not be 
necessary. There is so much land which clearly has little or no environmental 
or amenity value attached to its current use that would-be developers would 
confine their proposals to such land. The area of greenbelt land is 1.5 times 
the total area of cities in England, and even in the South East some 85% of 
the surface area is green space, mostly in agriculture (Barker 2006). So there 
would be more than enough land to allow urban expansion without significant 
But this is very weak and indirect. It is moreover very difficult to impose.
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damage to either the environment or to amenities. Such a system would guide 
all development to land with the lowest environmental quality and, if coupled 
with the application of a modified Community Infrastructure Levy designed to 
vary according to the actual costs development imposed on the community, 
would ensure that the costs of urban development internalised most of the 
externalities identified above as leading to market failure in land markets.
Such a proposal would have the additional advantage – rather like making the 
Bank of England independent in setting monetary policy – of distancing 
decisions from the political process, reducing both planning delays and 
political difficulties.
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